AIRPROX REPORT No 2011093

Date/Time: 28 Jul 2011 1433Z

Position: 5053N 00043W (2nm FIN APP RW24 Goodwood - elev 110ft)

Airspace: ATZ/LFIR (*Class: G*)

	Reporting Ac	*Reported Ac*
Type:	PA31	PA24
Operator:	Civ Pte	Civ Pte
Alt/FL:	1000ft↓ QNH (1022mb)	800ft↓ NK
Weather:	VMC CLOC	VMC CAVOK
Visibility:	10km	

Reported Separation:

50ft V/30-40m H 'underneath'

Recorded Separation:

<100ft V/<0·1nm H



PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

THE PA31 PILOT reports inbound to Chichester/Goodwood VFR and in receipt of a BS from Goodwood Information on 122·45MHz, squawking 7000 with Modes S and C. The visibility was 10km in VMC and the ac was coloured white/red; no lighting was mentioned. On approaching Goodwood from the ESE he was advised that RW24 was in use and that 3 ac were in the cct. He elected to join for a straight-in approach while listening to other traffic position reports and adjusting his speed accordingly. ATC advised him to join at 4nm and on reporting at 4nm he was asked to report at 2nm. The only traffic when calling at 4nm was on short final and sufficient space was available for his approach. At 2nm heading 240° at 110kt descending through 1000ft QNH 1022mb an ac appeared in his windscreen in his 2 o'clock range 30-40m and 50ft above passing from R to L just in front. He took avoiding action by increasing his ROD and reported the 'near miss' to Goodwood Information with the other ac's registration, possibly a PA28 type. He initially stated separation was 100ft but he was a little shocked and later thought it was definitely a lot closer. The other ac's pilot, when asked by ATC, confirmed that it was his ac that had flown in front of his PA31. He had not heard any radio calls from this flight stating its position or intentions prior to the 'near-miss'. He assessed the risk as high. He believed the other ac's pilot showed poor airmanship by not communicating his position and intentions to ATC, by flying across the FAT of a busy active RW at cct height, by showing a total disregard for the safety of his PA31 and that of others and dismissing the seriousness of the situation with no apology or offer of discussing the incident. He felt the other pilot will cause a similar situation in the future as he showed poor airmanship, poor judgement and dangerous flying.

THE PA24 PILOT reports inbound to Chichester/Goodwood from a private site near Hull, VFR and in receipt of an AFIS from Goodwood on 122·45MHz, squawking 7000 with Mode C. The Wx was CAVOK. Inbound he called at 5nm to run and was told that the RW in use was 24 operating RH ccts to the N. He requested to join downwind and shortly after this he recalled hearing another flight report 'late downwind'. He joined downwind and reported this on the RT and on reaching 2 DME from GWC, which he considered was late downwind, he turned onto R base and reported this on the radio. Heading 170° at 100kt descending through 800ft, it was then he heard another flight report 2nm final for the same RW. He immediately pulled-up while looking for the other ac and then spotted it as it passed beneath before the other ac's pilot reported a 'near-miss' on the frequency. He informed ATC that his ac was the reported one and he asked if he could orbit L and complete a

landing behind the other ac, which he did. While aware of an ac late downwind when he joined from the N, he didn't hear the flight report R base or turning finals or he wouldn't have turned in from downwind himself. After landing he telephoned ATC and discussed what happened and they thanked him for calling and told him the other ac's pilot did not wish to take matters further. He did not assess the risk. He thought it strange that Goodwood were operating ccts to the N given the proximity of the horse racing course on a race day, where helicopters are engaged in shuttle flights to and from the racecourse to the S. The cct seemed rather constrained when having to observe clearance from the racecourse, there being far more room to manoeuvre if fixed-wing ccts were to the S.

THE GOODWOOD FISO reports the PA31 flight was inbound from Shoreham and called to join the cct on a long final for RW24, initially reporting at 8nm. The PA24 flight called for joining information and read back all the details correctly. The PA31 pilot called at 2nm final and stated that an ac (initially identified as a PA28) had crossed the approach in front of his ac heading S'bound by around 100ft. ATS identified the ac as the PA24 and asked the pilot his intentions, who responded positioning for RW24. The PA31 landed safely at 1434 and vacated RW24 and the PA24 positioned onto short final for RW24 and landed safely at 1435; the pilot was asked to call the Tower after shut down.

Unofficial Goodwood MET observation gave 22010KT 9999 SCT/BKN025 Qxxxx=

ATSI reports that the unit did not impound the required information as requested, consequently no RT recording of the event is available. Therefore, this report is based on the reports from both pilots and the Goodwood FISO.

The pilot of the PA31 commented that no calls were made by the PA24 on the frequency before the Airprox occurred. The pilot of the PA24 stated that he had requested joining information from Goodwood and this was confirmed by the FISO. The PA24 pilot said he was 5nm from the airfield at the time. It is not known if this contact had occurred before the PA31 was listening on the frequency. The PA24 pilot was informed that the RW in use was 24, RH cct and he requested to join downwind. He continued to join the cct, later reporting downwind. When 2nm from GWC, he commenced a R turn onto R base, reporting this on the frequency. The FISO made no comments in his report about the PA24 reporting, or turning, on to R base. It was at this time the pilot of the PA24 heard the PA31 reporting on final approach at 2nm. He pulled up and spotted the PA31 as it passed underneath.

The FISO reported that the PA31 had requested to join the cct for a straight-in approach at 8nm. The pilot stated that he had been advised to join at 4nm and was informed about 3 ac in the cct. Reporting at 4nm, he was asked to call at 2nm. The only traffic he was aware of was landing traffic on short final. At 2nm, he sighted the PA24 in his 2 o'clock, 50ft above and 30-40m to the R. It passed R to L in front of his ac. He commented that he had heard no radio calls by this flight.

Without access to an RT recording it is not possible to confirm the calls and their respective timings made by both flights. Both pilots appeared not to hear the transmissions made by the other flight, until the pilot of the PA31 reported at 2nm. Neither reported being aware of the presence of the other ac until just before the Airprox occurred.

CAP427 (Flight Information Service and the FISO Licence) states:

> 'Flight Information Service is provided at an aerodrome to give information for the safe and efficient conduct of flights in the Aerodrome Traffic Zone. From the information received, pilots decide the appropriate course of action to be taken to ensure the safety of flight. A FISO (at an aerodrome) has the following responsibilities:
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> a) Issuing information to aircraft flying in the Aerodrome Traffic Zone (ATZ) to assist pilots in preventing collisions.

During the notified hours of watch of the FISO unit, entry of aircraft into the ATZ to transit or land is subject to the pilot obtaining information from the FISO which will enable the flight within the zone to be conducted safely'.

The UK AIP, Page AD 2-EGHR-1-5, Para 2.22 Flight Procedures for Goodwood states:

a. 'Fixed-wing circuit height 1200ft or as directed by ATS. Circuit directions: Runways 06, 14L/14R and 10 – LH; Runway 24, 28 and 32L/32R – RH or as directed by ATS.

b. Fixed-wing standard join is overhead at 2000ft. 'Straight-in' and 'base' joins are strongly discouraged when the circuit is active. ATS can advise on circuit status'.

Goodwood is situated within an ATZ (Class G airspace), circle radius 2nm centred on runway 14R/32L, with vertical limits from surface to 2000 ft aal; airfield elevation 110ft.

UKAB Note (1): The radar recording at 1431:10 shows the PA31 6nm ESE of Chichester/Goodwood tracking 315° squawking 7000 indicating unverified FL010 (1270ft QNH 1022mb) with another 7000 squawk, believed to be the PA24, 3·75nm NNW of Goodwood tracking 175° indicating unverified FL010 (1270ft QNH). At this time radar shows 2 other ac in the cct, 1 ac on a 1nm final and the other 1·5nm NE of Goodwood on R base leg. The PA24 passes 1·5nm W of Goodwood Racecourse before commencing a L turn at 1432:02 showing FL012 (1470ft QNH), rolling out onto a 080° track. Meanwhile, the PA31 has commenced a slow L turn towards RW24 final approach. At 1432:54 the PA24 is seen to commence a R turn onto base leg at FL010 (1270ft QNH) in the PA31's 1230 position range 1·25nm, the PA31 is now tracking 275° in a slow descent passing FL009 (1170ft QNH). The PA24 steadies on a 160° track and at 1433:10 is seen to also commence a descent passing FL009 (1170ft QNH) in the PA31's 12 o'clock range 0·1nm, the latter descending through FL008 (1070ft QNH). The next sweep 4sec later at 1433:14 shows the ac having crossed, both ac indicating FL008 with the PA24 tracking 140° and now 0·1nm SE of the PA31. The CPA occurs between radar sweeps but separation is estimated to <100ft and <0·1nm.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from the pilots of both ac, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the FISO involved and reports from the appropriate ATC authorities.

Members were disappointed that the RT was not impounded and available for transcription. Without this information, it was not known what information was broadcast on the frequency. From the reports received it appeared that both the PA31 and PA24 pilots had made calls on the frequency which were either not heard or assimilated by the other party. Although RT exchanges are an aid to pilots to build up their SA of the cct pattern, the primary means of avoidance in this Class G ATZ was through see and avoid. The PA24 pilot had joined the visual cct from the N, albeit in a truncated manner revealed from the radar plot, but had integrated behind the 2 other ac already established ahead. Members noted that the PA31 pilot had elected to join on a 'straight-in' approach with 3 ac in the cct, contrary to the guidance promulgated in the AIP; the radar recording shows the PA31 joining initially on a wide L base leg before commencing a gentle L turn onto final and placing it into conflict with the PA24 on R base. In doing so, Members agreed that the PA31 pilot did not integrate safely into the cct pattern and this had caused the Airprox. One controller Member opined that when the PA31 pilot called at 4nm he would have expected the FISO to update the cct status; however, the FISO had not made comment in his report and this element could not be corroborated owing to the lack of RT transcript. Another pilot Member commented that fitting-in with other cct traffic is more easily accomplished by entering the pattern either O/H, crosswind etc and adjusting the cct size accordingly, i.e. widening crosswind or extending downwind if required, whereas flying a straight-in approach leaves the pilot with only one option by adjusting his airspeed.

Turning to risk, the PA31 pilot was turning belly-up to the PA24 when he saw it 30-40m away and just 50ft above as it crossed from R to L, increasing his ROD to avoid. The PA24 pilot heard the PA31

pilot report at 2nm and pulled-up while looking for it and then saw the ac pass 'underneath'. Members thought that luck had played a part in this Airprox and it was fortunate the PA24 pilot's actions had mirrored those of the PA31 pilot. Taking these facts into account, combined with proximity of the ac revealed by the radar recording, the Board concluded that an actual risk of collision had existed during this encounter.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The PA31 pilot did not integrate safely into the cct pattern.

Degree of Risk: A.